

# **Alert (AA22-223A)**

**#StopRansomware: Zeppelin Ransomware** 

Original release date: August 11, 2022

## Summary

### Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:

- Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
- Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
- Enable and enforce multifactor authentication.

Note: this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Zeppelin ransomware IOCs and TTPs associated with ransomware variants identified through FBI investigations as recently as 21 June 2022.

The FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents.

Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 999 kb

Download the YARA signature for Zeppelin: YARA Signature, .yar 125 kb

Download the IOCs: <u>.stix 113 kb</u>

### **Technical Details**

Note: this advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 11. See <u>MITRE ATT&CK</u> for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques.

Zeppelin ransomware is a derivative of the Delphi-based Vega malware family and functions as a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS). From 2019 through at least June 2022, actors have used this malware to target a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure organizations, including defense contractors, educational institutions, manufacturers, technology companies, and especially organizations in the healthcare and medical industries. Zeppelin actors have been known to request ransom payments in Bitcoin, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand dollars to over a million dollars.

Zeppelin actors gain access to victim networks via RDP exploitation [T1133], exploiting SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities [T1190], and phishing campaigns [T1566]. Prior to deploying Zeppelin ransomware, actors spend one to two weeks mapping or enumerating the victim network to identify data enclaves, including cloud storage and network backups [TA0007]. Zeppelin actors can deploy Zeppelin ransomware as a .dll or .exe file or contained within a PowerShell loader. [1]

Prior to encryption, Zeppelin actors exfiltrate [TA0010] sensitive company data files to sell or publish in the event the victim refuses to pay the ransom. Once the ransomware is executed, a randomized nine-digit hexadecimal number is appended to each encrypted file as a file extension, e.g., file.txt.txt.C59-E0C-929 [T1486]. A note file with a ransom note is left on compromised systems, frequently on the desktop (see figure 1 below).



Figure 1: Sample Ransom Note

The FBI has observed instances where Zeppelin actors executed their malware multiple times within a victim's network, resulting in the creation of different IDs or file extensions, for each instance of an attack; this results in the victim needing several unique decryption keys.

# **Indicators of Compromise (IOC)**

See table 1 below for IOCs as of June 2022 obtained from FBI incident response investigations.

MD5	SHA1	SHA256
981526650af8d6f8f	4fee2cb5c98abbe556e9c	001938ed01bfde6b100927ff8199c65d1
20177a26abb513a	7ccfebe9df4f8cde53f	bff30381b80b846f2e3fe5a0d2df21d
c25d45e9bbfea29c	eaeff8d315cca71e99706	a42185d506e08160cb96c81801fbe173f
b6d9ee0d9bf2864d	3a2baec5cc73fad9453	b071f4a2f284830580541e057f4423b
183b6b0c90c1e027	1cb5e8132302b420af9b	aa7e2d63fc991990958dfb795a0aed254
6a2015752344a4cf	1e5f333c507d8b2a2441	149f185f403231eaebe35147f4b5ebe
9349e1cc3de7c7f68	db398e38ee6221df7e4a	a2a9385cbbcfacc2d541f5bd92c38b037
93a21bd6c3c4a6b	a49d8f96799cca4d87e1	6b15002901b2fd1cc62859e161a8037
c8f75487d0d496a3	4b91a91a98a2f0128c80f	54d567812eca7fc5f2ff566e7fb8a93618b
746e6c81a5ecc6dc	8ceeef0f5d293adf0cd	6d2357ce71776238e0b94d55172b1
477eedb422041385	9892cc90e6712d3548e4	fb59f163a2372d09cd0fc75341d3972fdd
e59a4fff72cb97c1	5f34f14f362bccedf0be	3087d2d507961303656b1d791b17c6
5841ef35aaff08bb0	ffd228b0d7afe7cab4e97	1e3c5a0aa079f8dfcc49cdca82891ab78
3d25e5afe3856a2	34f7093e7ba01c5a06e	d016a919d9810120b79c5deb332f388
d6c4b253ab1d169c	0f47c279fea1423c7a0e7	347f14497df4df73bc414f4e852c5490b1
f312fec12cc9a28f	bc967d9ff3fae7a0de8	2db991a4b3811712bac7476a3f1bc9
fba7180ad49d6a7f3	f561f9e3c949fe87f12dbf	7d8c4c742689c097ac861fcbf7734709fd
c60c890e2784704	a166ffb2eb85712419	7dcab1f7ef2ceffb4b0b7dec109f55
bc6c991941d9afbd	a243ce234fc8294e2e2e5	37c320983ae4c1fd0897736a53e5b0481
522fa0a2a248a97a	26418b4eaadc2d6c84f	edb1d1d91b366f047aa024b0fc0a86e
f3490951ae51922c	e2cb60be111716e32db7	894b03ed203cfa712a28ec472efec0ca9
b360a3d76a670159	ca2365ad6e73c30f0e21	a55d6058115970fe7d1697a3ddb0072
e4f1f05c2e6c3fc2f3	dbd9fcf2b05e703d34181	307877881957a297e41d75c84e9a965f
336a8c8799ffb4	c46f4c22392b9fcc1da	1cd07ac9d026314dcaff55c4da23d03e
aa2048271f0aef338	512b16ea74027fa4d005	bafd3434f3ba5bb9685e239762281d4c7
3480ce4a7c93b52	5831de5e51278812c8de	504de7e0cfd9d6394e4a85b4882ff5d
f66b738e1bfe1f8aa	571f50fee0acad1da39fe	faa79c796c27b11c4f007023e50509662
b510abed850c424	06c75116461800cc719	eac4bca99a71b26a9122c260abfb3c6
bb30f050546f5d6e6	ee44179f64918f72a8d2e	e48cf17caffc40815efb907e522475722f0
1fafc59eaf097c3	88a5074d89efab3d81b	59990afc19ac516592231a783e878
78621f1e196497d4	eed7c3bb3fc5181b88abe	4a4be110d587421ad50d2b1a38b108fa
40afb57f4609fcf9	ed2204997f350324022	05f314631066a2e96a1c85cc05814080
f4e0ee0200de3976	bd3f6b878284a63c72e8	9ef90ec912543cc24e18e73299296f14c
91748a2cdcd7e34a	354e877e3f48d6fca53c	b2c931a5d633d4c097efa372ae59846

MD5	SHA1	SHA256
981526650af8d6f8f	4fee2cb5c98abbe556e9c	001938ed01bfde6b100927ff8199c65d1
20177a26abb513a	7ccfebe9df4f8cde53f	bff30381b80b846f2e3fe5a0d2df21d
c25d45e9bbfea29c	eaeff8d315cca71e99706	a42185d506e08160cb96c81801fbe173f
b6d9ee0d9bf2864d	3a2baec5cc73fad9453	b071f4a2f284830580541e057f4423b
183b6b0c90c1e027	1cb5e8132302b420af9b	aa7e2d63fc991990958dfb795a0aed254
6a2015752344a4cf	1e5f333c507d8b2a2441	149f185f403231eaebe35147f4b5ebe
9349e1cc3de7c7f68	db398e38ee6221df7e4a	a2a9385cbbcfacc2d541f5bd92c38b037
93a21bd6c3c4a6b	a49d8f96799cca4d87e1	6b15002901b2fd1cc62859e161a8037
c8f75487d0d496a3	4b91a91a98a2f0128c80f	54d567812eca7fc5f2ff566e7fb8a93618b
746e6c81a5ecc6dc	8ceeef0f5d293adf0cd	6d2357ce71776238e0b94d55172b1
477eedb422041385	9892cc90e6712d3548e4	fb59f163a2372d09cd0fc75341d3972fdd
e59a4fff72cb97c1	5f34f14f362bccedf0be	3087d2d507961303656b1d791b17c6
cf5a358a22326f09f	1addcffae4fd4211ea242	dd89d939c941a53d6188232288a3bd73
d55983bb812b7d8	02783c2ffad6771aa34	ba9baf0b4ca6bf6ccca697d9ee42533f
7afe492a38ca6f27e	5870a3adbce9737319f3c	79d6e498e7789aaccd8caa610e8c1583
24028aab68406b5	9461586d5f2afbc7adb	6267c6a668c322111708cf80bc38286c
1da1c0115caca5ebf	5edb8b651c7013ebaba2	b22b3625bcce7b010c0ee621434878c5f
064380eb7490041	eb81c87df76a1e0724d6	8d7691c2a101ae248dd221a70668ac0
8c3c663ffcf363d087	905726d178962dd1d7fe	961fbc7641f04f9fed8391c387f01d64435
f4e114a79945ca	87504d051aca440740b8	dda6af1164be58c4cb808b08cc910
17c5cae3bce5832d	6f70e73c53d7622d8c480	d618c1ccd24d29e911cd3e899a4df2625
d42986fe612517d9	8ae7849133df1343484	155297e80f4c5c1354bc2e79f70768c
bfe7f54f1f0640936d	9436ccee41c01ca3cb4d	8170612574f914eec9e66902767b8344
d7a3384608b1f6	b55c10884615aba76d19	32a75b1d6ae510f77546af2a291a48a2
f28af04ef0370addfe	cfcfa995c15d9f33de21d0	5326f52bd9a7a52759fe2fde3407dc28e
bfdd31f1ec25ed	dd88d3b95d0f91d6bc	8c2caa33abf1c09c47b192a1c004c12
f3bcad5358f89df1e	eb036759beb28f86ee98	6bafc7e2c7edc2167db187f50106e57b4
b0294ef53f54437	1bdca4fad24152b82d8c	9d4a0e1b9269f1d8a40f824f2ccb42b
b1f6370582fbaf5c5	4b2d0127699f708a8116	f7af51f1b2b98b482885b702508bd65d3
1e826fecef53cd7	bff8f25c9d6140033197	10108a506e6d8cef3986e69f972c67d
de785ed922d4e737	4d280105e724db851f03	bc214c74bdf6f6781f0de994750ba3c50c
dc0fa0bb30a4de8b	de8fc76409ef4057ff2c	0e10d9db3483183bd47f5cef154509
7a296f7c1ac4aeee	c13542310f7a4e50a782	ed1548744db512a5502474116828f757
18d4c23476735be7	47fc7334096ca09c5d7f	37aec8bb11133d5e4ad44be16aa3666b
37f18b38e1af6533d	d3929331d9bc278dea56	cf9b6dda84cbf2dbfc6edd7a740f50bddc
93bbb3f2ddb86dc	07aec1574012a08de861	128842565c590d8126e5d93c024ff2

MD5	SHA1	SHA256
981526650af8d6f8f	4fee2cb5c98abbe556e9c	001938ed01bfde6b100927ff8199c65d1
20177a26abb513a	7ccfebe9df4f8cde53f	bff30381b80b846f2e3fe5a0d2df21d
c25d45e9bbfea29c	eaeff8d315cca71e99706	a42185d506e08160cb96c81801fbe173f
b6d9ee0d9bf2864d	3a2baec5cc73fad9453	b071f4a2f284830580541e057f4423b
183b6b0c90c1e027	1cb5e8132302b420af9b	aa7e2d63fc991990958dfb795a0aed254
6a2015752344a4cf	1e5f333c507d8b2a2441	149f185f403231eaebe35147f4b5ebe
9349e1cc3de7c7f68	db398e38ee6221df7e4a	a2a9385cbbcfacc2d541f5bd92c38b037
93a21bd6c3c4a6b	a49d8f96799cca4d87e1	6b15002901b2fd1cc62859e161a8037
c8f75487d0d496a3	4b91a91a98a2f0128c80f	54d567812eca7fc5f2ff566e7fb8a93618b
746e6c81a5ecc6dc	8ceeef0f5d293adf0cd	6d2357ce71776238e0b94d55172b1
477eedb422041385	9892cc90e6712d3548e4	fb59f163a2372d09cd0fc75341d3972fdd
e59a4fff72cb97c1	5f34f14f362bccedf0be	3087d2d507961303656b1d791b17c6
291de974e5cbe5e3	def93f18aaf146fe8f3c4f9	21807d9fcaa91a0945e80d92778760e7
d47e3d17487e027f	a257364f181197608	856268883d36139a1ad29ab91f9d983d
99d59c862a082b20	908a9026d61717b5fa29	0d22d3d637930e7c26a0f16513ec43824
7a868e409ce2d97c	959478a9bd939da9206f	3a8a01ea9c9d856acbcda61fcb7b499
d27125d534e398f1	1862f063c30cd02cfea60	6fbfc8319ed7996761b613c18c8cb6b92
873b7f4835a79f09	70d3dba41ac5eee2a35	a1eaed1555dae6c6b8e2594ac5fa2b9
4534f2afe5f7df1d99	e2cc94e471509f9fa5862	e8596675fef4ad8378e4220c22f4358fdb
8f37ad4e35afeb	0b8bb56d77f2cfe74b0	4a20531b59d7df5382c421867520a9
7ab0676262c681b8	2f1803d444891abb6048	353e59e96cbf6ea6c16d06da5579d3815
ec15bdada17d7476	64d476a8feac0d614f77	aaaeeefacabd7b35ba31f7b17207c5b
d7d3d23a5e796be8	a9771c591f6ccc2f3419d	85f9bf4d07bc2ac1891e367f077dd513d6
44af443bda5cd67e	571c64ab93228785771	ca07705bffd1b648d32a7b2dc396f5
0a1cd4efda7543cec	af4f8d889d6a2049e7a37	614cb70659ef5bb2f641f09785adc4ab58
406a6822418daf6	9ea197f8cd361feb074	73e0564a5303252d3c141a899253b2
23eda650479fc490	b1e6527c10f68586f7f1a	fb3e0f1e6f53ffe680d66d2143f06eb6363
8d0ddff713508025	279ed439d46c3f12a06	897d374dc5dc63eb2f28188b8ad83
6607d8c1a28d7538	f618879c011cde3440660	594df9c402abfdc3c838d871c3395ac04
e2a6565cf40d1260	72949f025827feea663	7f256b2ac2fd6ff66b371252978348d
caa7a669da39ffd8a	44538b7f8f065e3cef004	2dffe3ba5c70af51ddf0ff5a322eba0746f
3a4f3419018b363	9089a8522a76a7fccc6	3bf3ae0751beb3dc0059ed3faaf3d
48b844494a746ca9	7bf83b98f798f3a8f4ce85	45fba1ef399f41227ae4d14228253237b
6c7b96d6bd90f45f	b6d29554a435e516e3	5eb464f56cab92c91a6a964dc790622

MD5	SHA1	SHA256
981526650af8d6f8f	4fee2cb5c98abbe556e9c	001938ed01bfde6b100927ff8199c65d1
20177a26abb513a	7ccfebe9df4f8cde53f	bff30381b80b846f2e3fe5a0d2df21d
c25d45e9bbfea29c	eaeff8d315cca71e99706	a42185d506e08160cb96c81801fbe173f
b6d9ee0d9bf2864d	3a2baec5cc73fad9453	b071f4a2f284830580541e057f4423b
183b6b0c90c1e027	1cb5e8132302b420af9b	aa7e2d63fc991990958dfb795a0aed254
6a2015752344a4cf	1e5f333c507d8b2a2441	149f185f403231eaebe35147f4b5ebe
9349e1cc3de7c7f68	db398e38ee6221df7e4a	a2a9385cbbcfacc2d541f5bd92c38b037
93a21bd6c3c4a6b	a49d8f96799cca4d87e1	6b15002901b2fd1cc62859e161a8037
c8f75487d0d496a3	4b91a91a98a2f0128c80f	54d567812eca7fc5f2ff566e7fb8a93618b
746e6c81a5ecc6dc	8ceeef0f5d293adf0cd	6d2357ce71776238e0b94d55172b1
477eedb422041385	9892cc90e6712d3548e4	fb59f163a2372d09cd0fc75341d3972fdd
e59a4fff72cb97c1	5f34f14f362bccedf0be	3087d2d507961303656b1d791b17c6
9c13ab7b79aec8dc	4b4d865132329e0dd1d1	774ef04333c3fb2a6a4407654e28c2900
02869999773cd4b2	29e85fc4fa9ad0c1d206	c62bd202ad6e5909336eb9bc180d279
450e5bf4b4269192	665a563157f4aa0033a1	677035259ba8342f1a624fd09168c4201
4d09267ac1a570cb	5c88f55ac4fa28397b49	7bdca9ebc0b39bf6c37852899331460
51104215a618a5f5	801580a46f9759ceeeeb	26ec12b63c0e4e60d839aea592c4b5dcf
6ad9c884d6832f79	bce419d879e2ed6943fe	f853589b53626e1dbf8c656f4ee6c64
73627cbe2ba139e2	1116dc35993fce8118e1e	37efe10b04090995e2f3d9f932c3653b2
ec26889a4e8d6284	5421000a70b6777433f	7a65fc76811fa583934a725d41a6b08
935f54b6609c5339	a809327d39fab61bfcfac0	a5847867730e7849117c31cdae8bb0a2
001579e96dc34244	c97b1d4b3bfb9a2cfe	5004635d49f366fbfaebce034d865d7d
ba681db97f283c2e	5d28acf52f399793e82ec	e61edbddf9aed8a52e9be1165a0440f1b
784d9bb4969b1f5a	7e79da47d372d9175d7	6e9943ae634148df0d0517a0cf2db13
c1ab7b68262b5ab3	b8c74327831e460d2b2a	746f0c02c832b079aec221c04d2a4eb79
1c45327e7138fd25	8eb7e68ee68938779d8d	0287f6d10d39b95595a7df4086f457f
f818938b987236cd	bfed40f050175935277c8	b191a004b6d8a706aba82a2d1052bcb7
d41195796b4c1fb5	02cbbbce132f44c06ec	bed0c286a0a6e4e0c4723f073af52e7c
0a1cd4efda7543cec	af4f8d889d6a2049e7a37	614cb70659ef5bb2f641f09785adc4ab58
406a6822418daf6	9ea197f8cd361feb074	73e0564a5303252d3c141a899253b2
d7d3d23a5e796be8	a9771c591f6ccc2f3419d	85f9bf4d07bc2ac1891e367f077dd513d6
44af443bda5cd67e	571c64ab93228785771	ca07705bffd1b648d32a7b2dc396f5
7ab0676262c681b8	2f1803d444891abb6048	353e59e96cbf6ea6c16d06da5579d3815
ec15bdada17d7476	64d476a8feac0d614f77	aaaeeefacabd7b35ba31f7b17207c5b

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981526650af8d6f8f	4fee2cb5c98abbe556e9c	001938ed01bfde6b100927ff8199c65d1
20177a26abb513a	7ccfebe9df4f8cde53f	bff30381b80b846f2e3fe5a0d2df21d
c25d45e9bbfea29c	eaeff8d315cca71e99706	a42185d506e08160cb96c81801fbe173f
b6d9ee0d9bf2864d	3a2baec5cc73fad9453	b071f4a2f284830580541e057f4423b
183b6b0c90c1e027	1cb5e8132302b420af9b	aa7e2d63fc991990958dfb795a0aed254
6a2015752344a4cf	1e5f333c507d8b2a2441	149f185f403231eaebe35147f4b5ebe
9349e1cc3de7c7f68	db398e38ee6221df7e4a	a2a9385cbbcfacc2d541f5bd92c38b037
93a21bd6c3c4a6b	a49d8f96799cca4d87e1	6b15002901b2fd1cc62859e161a8037
c8f75487d0d496a3	4b91a91a98a2f0128c80f	54d567812eca7fc5f2ff566e7fb8a93618b
746e6c81a5ecc6dc	8ceeef0f5d293adf0cd	6d2357ce71776238e0b94d55172b1
477eedb422041385	9892cc90e6712d3548e4	fb59f163a2372d09cd0fc75341d3972fdd
e59a4fff72cb97c1	5f34f14f362bccedf0be	3087d2d507961303656b1d791b17c6
4534f2afe5f7df1d99	e2cc94e471509f9fa5862	e8596675fef4ad8378e4220c22f4358fdb
8f37ad4e35afeb	0b8bb56d77f2cfe74b0	4a20531b59d7df5382c421867520a9
d27125d534e398f1	1862f063c30cd02cfea60	6fbfc8319ed7996761b613c18c8cb6b92
873b7f4835a79f09	70d3dba41ac5eee2a35	a1eaed1555dae6c6b8e2594ac5fa2b9
99d59c862a082b20	908a9026d61717b5fa29	0d22d3d637930e7c26a0f16513ec43824
7a868e409ce2d97c	959478a9bd939da9206f	3a8a01ea9c9d856acbcda61fcb7b499

# MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES

Zeppelin actors use the ATT&CK techniques listed in Table 2.

10	abie 2: Zeppeiin	Actors Allock	Techniques Jo	or Enterprise	
In	itial Access				

<u>Initial Access</u>			
Technique Title	ID	Use	
Exploit External Remote Services	<u>T1133</u>	Zeppelin actors exploit RDP to gain access to victim networks.	
Exploit Public-Facing Application	<u>T1190</u>	Zeppelin actors exploit vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems to gain access to systems	
Phishing	<u>T1566</u>	Zeppelin actors have used phishing and spear phishing to gain access to victims' networks.	
Execution	L		

Technique Title	ID	Use		
Malicious Link	<u>T1204.001</u>	Zeppelin actors trick users to click a malicious link to execute malicious macros.		
Malicious File Attachment	T1204.002	Zeppelin actors trick users to click a malicious attachment disguised as advertisements to execute malicious macros.		
<u>Persistence</u>				
Technique Title	ID	Use		
Modify System Process	T1543.003	Zeppelin actors encrypt Windows Operating functions to preserve compromised system functions.		
<u>Impact</u>				
Technique Title	ID	Use		
Data Encrypted for Impact	<u>T1486</u>	Zeppelin actors have encrypted data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.		

#### **DETECTION**

Download the YARA signature for Zeppelin: YARA Signature, .yar 125 kb

## Mitigations

The FBI and CISA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Zeppelin ransomware:

- Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).
- Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing password policies.
  - Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length;

- Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers;
- Add password user "salts" to shared login credentials;
- Avoid reusing passwords;
- o Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts;
- Disable password "hints";
- Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password "patterns" cyber criminals can easily decipher.
- o Require administrator credentials to install software.
- Require multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.
- **Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date.** Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Prioritize patching SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities and <a href="known exploited vulnerabilities">known exploited vulnerabilities</a> in internet-facing systems. Note: SonicWall maintains a vulnerability list that includes Advisory ID, CVE, and mitigation. Their list can be found at <a href="psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-list">psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-list</a>.
- **Segment networks** to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement.
- Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.
- Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.
- Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts.
- Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege.
- Disable unused ports.
- Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.
- **Disable hyperlinks** in received emails.
- Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task.

- **Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions**. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally.
- Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. By instituting this practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data.
- Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization's data infrastructure.

#### **RESOURCES**

- <u>Stopransomware.gov</u> is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.
- Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide.
- No-cost cyber hygiene services: <u>Cyber Hygiene Services</u> and <u>Ransomware Readiness</u> Assessment.

#### REPORTING

The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with Zeppelin actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file. The FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office, CISA at us-cert.cisa.gov/report, or the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) at a USSS Field Office.

#### **DISCLAIMER**

The information in this report is being provided "as is" for informational purposes only. CISA and the FBI do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA or the FBI.

### References

[1] What is Zeppelin Ransomware? Steps to Prepare, Respond, and Prevent Infecti...

### Revisions

August 11, 2022: Initial Version