

Sugar Ransomware, a new RaaS

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An actor recently has been starting up a RaaS solution that appears to primarily focus on individual computers instead of entire enterprises but is also reusing objects from other ransomware families. Not a lot has been discussed about this ransomware but we did find a tweet mentioning one of the samples[3] during our research.

Crypter

We will go over the crypter being used because it has code reuse from the ransomware itself which makes it significantly more interesting than your typical crypter. The crypter has what initially looks like RC4 encryption leading to APLib decompression but as we dug in it turns out to be a modified version of RC4.

The encoded data can be seen with the key prepended to the data:

Key Length

Кеу

Length of Encrypted Binary

Start of Encrypted Binary

00	00	00	4A	7D	45	С8	25	32	9B	DE	AB	9B	45	7A	J}EÈ%2>Þ«>Ez
ЗB	C1	52	30	D3	00	00	40	A6	FF	9D	A0	2A	95	21	.;ÁR0Ó@¦ÿ.·*•!
92	66	E2	46	46	C1	CE	75	7E	E5	EF	D6	8D	2D	СВ	.'fâFFÁÎu∼åïÖË
60	62	33	30	22	F5	01	A5	43	10	37	13	BE	6C	F6	a`b30"õ.¥C.7.¾lö
9D	63	4E	E8	99	BF	20	53	B1	12	45	FA	7C	CD	E8	6.cN虿∙S±.Eú Íè
0E	6C	08	EA	B1	75	43	B7	62	74	C4	09	54	3F	13	0.l.ê±uC∙btÄ.T?.
F1	75	82	DA	D1	7D	C5	18	D1	9B	B5	AC	2C	51	15	Bñu,ÚÑ}Å.Ñ>µ¬,Q.
3C	1A	A9	6A	36	05	0 E	82	0B	DC	EB	C5	F6	39	D1	ì<.@j6,.ÜëÅö9Ñ
15	8F	D2	ØD	EC	36	51	99	BD	С1	2E	81	30	2A	C5	~Ò.ì6Q™‰Á0*Å
8B	73	E1	90	DE	98	7A	EA	17	21	F0	A1	A1	AE	05	,≺sá.Þ~zê.!𦦮.
D2	66	51	56	33	98	5F	80	79	5D	43	BE	D8	03	89	ýÒfQV3~_€y]C¾Ø.‰
	00 3B 92 60 9D 0E 71 3C 15 8B 02	00 00 3B C1 92 66 60 62 9D 63 0E 6C F1 75 3C 1A 15 8F 8B 73 D2 66	00 00 00 3B C1 52 92 66 E2 60 62 33 9D 63 4E 0E 6C 08 F1 75 82 3C 1A A9 15 8F D2 8B 73 E1 D2 66 51	00 00 00 4A 3B C1 52 30 92 66 E2 46 60 62 33 30 9D 63 4E E8 0E 6C 08 EA F1 75 82 DA 3C 1A A9 6A 15 8F D2 0D 8B 73 E1 90 D2 66 51 56	00 00 00 00 4A 7D 3B C1 52 30 D3 92 66 E2 46 46 60 62 33 30 22 9D 63 4E E8 99 0E 6C 08 EA B1 F1 75 82 DA D1 3C 1A A9 6A 36 15 8F D2 0D EC 8B 73 E1 90 DE D2 66 51 56 33	00 00 00 4A 7D 45 3B C1 52 30 D3 00 92 66 E2 46 46 C1 60 62 33 30 22 F5 9D 63 4E E8 99 BF 0E 6C 08 EA B1 75 F1 75 82 DA D1 7D 3C 1A A9 6A 36 05 15 8F D2 0D EC 36 8B 73 E1 90 DE 98 D2 66 51 56 33 98	00 00 00 00 4A 7D 45 C8 3B C1 52 30 D3 00 00 92 66 E2 46 46 C1 CE 60 62 33 30 22 F5 01 9D 63 4E E8 99 BF 20 0E 6C 08 EA B1 75 43 F1 75 82 DA D1 7D C5 3C 1A A9 6A 36 05 0E 15 8F D2 0D EC 36 51 8B 73 E1 90 DE 98 7A D2 66 51 56 33 98 5F	00 00 00 4A 7D 45 C8 25 3B C1 52 30 D3 00 00 40 92 66 E2 46 46 C1 CE 75 60 62 33 30 22 F5 01 A5 9D 63 4E E8 99 BF 20 53 0E 6C 08 EA B1 75 43 B7 1F1 75 82 DA D1 7D C5 18 3C 1A A9 6A 36 05 0E 82 15 8F D2 0D EC 36 51 99 8B 73 E1 90 DE 98 7A EA D2 66 51 56 33 98 5F 80	00 00 00 4A 7D 45 C8 25 32 3B C1 52 30 D3 00 00 40 A6 92 66 E2 46 46 C1 CE 75 7E 60 62 33 30 22 F5 01 A5 43 9D 63 4E E8 99 BF 20 53 B1 0E 6C 08 EA B1 75 43 B7 62 17 75 82 DA D1 7D C5 18 D1 3C 1A A9 6A 36 05 0E 82 0B 15 8F D2 0D EC 36 51 99 BD 8B 73 E1 90 DE 98 7A EA 17 0D2 66 51 56 33 98 5F 80 79	00 00 00 4A 7D 45 C8 25 32 9B 3B C1 52 30 D3 00 00 40 A6 FF 92 66 E2 46 46 C1 CE 75 7E E5 60 62 33 30 22 F5 01 A5 43 10 9D 63 4E E8 99 BF 20 53 B1 12 0E 6C 08 EA B1 75 43 B7 62 74 F1 75 82 DA D1 7D C5 18 D1 9B 3C 1A A9 6A 36 05 0E 82 0B DC 15 8F D2 0D EC 36 51 99 BD C1 8B 73 E1 90 DE 98 7A EA 17 21 D2 66	00 00 00 4A 7D 45 C8 25 32 9B DE 3B C1 52 30 D3 00 00 40 A6 FF 9D 92 66 E2 46 46 C1 CE 75 7E E5 EF 60 62 33 30 22 F5 01 A5 43 10 37 9D 63 4E E8 99 BF 20 53 B1 12 45 0E 6C 08 EA B1 75 43 B7 62 74 C4 F1 75 82 DA D1 7D C5 18 D1 9B B5 3C 1A A9 6A 36 05 0E 82 0B DC EB 15 8F D2 0D EC 36 51 99 BD C1 2E 8B 73 E1 90	00 00 00 4A 7D 45 C8 25 32 9B DE AB 3B C1 52 30 D3 00 00 40 A6 FF 9D A0 92 66 E2 46 46 C1 CE 75 7E E5 EF D6 60 62 33 30 22 F5 01 A5 43 10 37 13 9D 63 4E E8 99 BF 20 53 B1 12 45 FA 0E 6C 08 EA B1 75 43 B7 62 74 C4 09 1F1 75 82 DA D1 7D C5 18 D1 9B B5 AC 3C 1A A9 6A 36 05 0E 82 0B DC EB C5 315 8F D2 0D EC 36 51 99	00 00 00 4A 7D 45 C8 25 32 9B DE AB 9B 3B C1 52 30 D3 00 00 40 A6 FF 9D A0 2A 92 66 E2 46 46 C1 CE 75 7E E5 EF D6 8D 60 62 33 30 22 F5 01 A5 43 10 37 13 BE 9D 63 4E E8 99 BF 20 53 B1 12 45 FA 7C 0E 6C 08 EA B1 75 43 B7 62 74 C4 09 54 F1 75 82 DA D1 7D C5 18 D1 9B B5 AC 2C 3C 1A A9 6A 36 05 0E 82 0B DC EB C5 F6	00 00 00 4A 7D 45 C8 25 32 9B DE AB 9B 45 3B C1 52 30 D3 00 00 40 A6 FF 9D A0 2A 95 92 66 E2 46 46 C1 CE 75 7E E5 EF D6 8D 2D 60 62 33 30 22 F5 01 A5 43 10 37 13 BE 6C 9D 63 4E E8 99 BF 20 53 B1 12 45 FA 7C CD 0E 6C 08 EA B1 75 43 B7 62 74 C4 09 54 3F 1F1 75 82 DA D1 7D C5 18 D1 9B B5 AC 2C 51 3C 1A A9 6A 36 05 0E	00 00 00 4A 7D 45 C8 25 32 9B DE AB 9B 45 7A 3B C1 52 30 D3 00 00 40 A6 FF 9D A0 2A 95 21 92 66 E2 46 46 C1 CE 75 7E E5 EF D6 8D 2D CB 60 62 33 30 22 F5 01 A5 43 10 37 13 BE 6C F6 9D 63 4E E8 99 BF 20 53 B1 12 45 FA 7C CD E8 0E 6C 08 EA B1 75 43 B7 62 74 C4 09 54 3F 13 1F1 75 82 DA D1 7D C5 18 D1 9B B5 AC 2C 51 15

As we mentioned above the encryption algorithm first looks like RC4, it sets up the SBOX:



SBOX initialization

However starting with the KSA block is where things change:

🚺 🚄 loc 401227: push edi call sub 4010B3 edx, ds:lpAddress mov MOVZX esi, al pop ecx cl, [edx+edi*4] mov eax, [edx+esi*4] MOV [edx+edi*4], eax mov Loads from back instead of front dec edi eax, ds:lpAddress mov ecx, cl MOVZX [eax+esi*4], ecx mov edi, 1 CMP short loc 401227 jge

Custom KSA

The algorithm cycles through the SBOX during KSA from back to front, it also leverages a simple bitwise OR loop to build a value which is used to bitwise AND against the working value from the key, if the value is greater than or equal to the current SBOX iteration then it will continue to the next value in the key. Afterwards it begins a custom version of PRGA that involves some extra shuffling based on four values from the post KSA SBOX.

🚺 🚄 🔛	
mov	ecx, ds:1pAddress
mov	edi, [ebp+var_8]
MOV	esi, [ebp+dwSize]
MOV	eax, [ecx+4]
MOV	[ecx+400h], eax
MOV	ecx, ds:1pAddress
MOV	eax, [ecx+0Ch]
MOV	[ecx+404h], eax
MOV	ecx, ds:1pAddress
MOV	eax, [ecx+14h]
MOV	[ecx+408h], eax
MOV	ecx, ds:1pAddress
MOV	eax, [ecx+1Ch]
MOV	[ecx+40Ch], eax
MOVZX	eax, ds:byte_401A68
MOV	ecx, ds:1pAddress
MOV	eax, [ecx+eax*4]
MOV	[ecx+410h], eax

After custom KSA

```
add
        eax, [ecx+408h]
        eax, ØFFh
and
MOV
        [ecx+408h], eax
MOV
        edx, ds:lpAddress
        eax, [edx+410h]
MOV
MOV
        ecx, [edx+408h]
MOV
        bl, [edx+eax*4]
add
        bl, [edx+ecx*4]
mov
        eax, [edx+40Ch]
add
        bl, [edx+eax*4]
        eax, [ebp+var_4]
MOV
MOVZX
        eax, byte ptr [esi+eax]
        [edx+40Ch], eax
MOV
MOV
        esi, ds:lpAddress
        eax, [esi+404h]
mov
        ecx, [esi+400h]
MOV
MOV
        edx, [esi+eax*4]
        edx, [esi+ecx*4]
add
        eax, bl
MOVZX
and
        edx, ØFFh
        ebx, ØFFh
MOV
        eax, [esi+eax*4]
MOV
MOV
        ecx, [esi+edx*4]
        ecx, [esi+eax*4]
xor
        ecx, [esi+40Ch]
xor
        [esi+410h], ecx
MOV
        eax, ds:lpAddress
MOV
MOV
        ecx, [ebp+var_4]
MOV
        esi, [ebp+var_C]
        al, [eax+410h]
mov
MOV
        [ecx], al
inc
        ecx
mov
        [ebp+var 4], ecx
dec
        edi
jnz
        1oc 4012C9
```

Custom PRGA

Unpacking code: import yara from pefile import PE from struct import unpack from aplib import Decompress from io import BytesIO from sys import argvdef main(): filepath = argv[1]

```
readbin = open(filepath, 'rb').read()
    rule = yara.compile(
        source='rule sugar RaaS crypter { strings: '
        '$57B = { C7 [1] 08 04 00 00 05 00 00 00 A1 [4] C7 [1] 0C
04 00 00 07 00 00 00 A1 [4] C7 [1] 10 04 00 00 0B 00 00 00 A1 } '
        '$EP = { C2 04 00 6A 00 E8 [4] 33 [1] C2 04 } '
        '$AP = { E8 2C 00 00 00 3D 00 7D 00 00 73 0A 80 FC 05 73
06 83 F8 7F } '
        'condition: filesize < 200KB and uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x4550 and $57B and $EP at (entrypoint-3)
and $AP }'
    yara match = rule.match(data=readbin)if yara match != {}:
        try:
            pe = PE(filepath)
        except:
            print('not valid PE')
                          dsect = [
            exit()
            pe.sections[i].get_data() for i in
range(len(pe.sections)) if pe.sections[i].Name.rsplit(b'\x00')[0]
== b'.data'
            1[0]
        klen = unpack('I', dsect[:4])[0]
        key = dsect[4:4+klen]
        elen = unpack('I', dsect[4+klen:8+klen])[0]
        ebin = dsect[klen+8:klen+8+elen]
        apbin = custom_decryption(key, ebin)
        decrypted_bin = Decompress(BytesIO(apbin)).do()
        fspl = filepath.split('/')[-1]
        fn = fspl.split('.')[0] + '_unpacked.' +
fspl.split('.')[1] if '.' in fspl else fspl + ' unpacked'
        fp = '/'.join(filepath.split('/')[:-1]) + '/' + fn
        out = open(fp, 'wb')
        out.write(decrypted_bin)def custom_decryption(key, data):
    sbox = [i for i in range(256)]
    kb = [key[i % len(key)] for i in range(256)] c = 255
    i = 0
    t = 0
    o = b''
   while c > 0:
        v = 1
       while v < c:
            v = (v|1) + v
                            d = (t + kb[j % 256]) % 256
        b = (d \& v) \% 256
```

```
j += 1
        if b > c:
            t = d
                             sbox[c], sbox[b] = sbox[b], sbox[c]
            continue
        t = d
                  eb = sbox + [sbox[1]] + [sbox[3]] + [sbox[5]] +
        c -= 1
[sbox[7]] + [sbox[t]] for i in range(len(data)):
        eb[257] = (eb[257] + eb[eb[256]]) % 256
        eb[256] = (eb[256] + 1) % 256
        b1 = eb[eb[260]]
        eb[eb[260]] = eb[eb[257]]
        eb[eb[257]] = eb[eb[259]]
        eb[eb[259]] = eb[eb[256]]
        eb[eb[256]] = b1
        eb[258] = (eb[b1] + eb[258]) % 256
        b1 = (((eb[eb[258]] + eb[eb[259]]) \% 256) + eb[eb[260]])
% 256
        eb[260] = data[i]
        v = (eb[eb[256]] + eb[eb[257]]) % 256
        x1 = eb[v] \land eb[eb[b1]]
        x2 = x1 ^ data[i]
        eb[259] = x2
        o += bytes([x2])
    return omain()
```

Ransomware Sample

The malware is written in Delphi but the interesting part from a RE perspective was the reuse of the same routine from the crypter as part of the string decoding in the malware, this would lead us to believe that they have the same dev and the crypter is probably part of the build process or some service the main actor offers to their affiliates.



After the SBOX is initialized same as we previously discussed in the crypter we can see the same customized process for RC4 KSA and PRGA performed as was shown in the crypter section.

,									
🔲 🏄 🔤									
100 4	100 414300 -								
nush	ehn								
mou	eax, esi								
call	sub 4141D8								
рор	ecx								
and	eax, ØFFh								
mov	edi, [ebx+esi*4]								
mov	edx, [ebx+eax*4]								
mov	[ebx+esi*4], edx								
mov	[ebx+eax*4], edi								
dec	esi								
test	esi, esi								
jnz	short loc_4143AA								
									
📕 🚄 🔛	5								
mov	eax, [ebx+4]								
mov	[ebx+400h], eax								
mov	eax, [ebx+0Ch]								
mov	[ebx+404h], eax								
MOV	eax, [ebx+14h]								
mov	[ebx+408h], eax								
MOV	eax, [ebx+1Ch]								
MOV	[ebx+40Ch], eax								
xor	eax, eax								
mov	ai, [epp+var_9]								
MOV	eax, [epx+eax*4]								
MOV	[eox+410n], eax								

Custom KSA

Because of the way Delphi lays out their strings decoding them is a pretty straight forward process using the same sort of code as the

```
crypter, we just need to find each string and key pair.
if __name__ == "__main__":
    data = open(sys.argv[1], 'rb').read()
  curr = 0
 t = data.find(b'\xff\xff\xff\xff')
  done = False
```

```
while not done and t:
 curr += t
 (a,b) = struct.unpack from('<II', data[curr:])</pre>
 if b > 1000:
  continue
 key = data[curr+8:curr+8+b]
 next = data[curr+8+b:].find(b'\xff\xff\xff\xff')
 curr += 8+b+next
 (a2,b2) = struct.unpack_from('<II', data[curr:])</pre>
 if b2 > 1000:
  continue
 blob = data[curr+8:curr+8+b2]
 curr += 8+b2
 try:
  print(decode_data(key,data))
 except:
  pass
 t = data[curr:].find(b'\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff)
 if t == -1:
  done = True
```

Convert above to python3

```
Decoded strings:
browser
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
notepad.exe
desktop
--c=show
--net=0
[+] Process started.
software\
.txt
single
network
-data=
\cmd.txt
c:\
Your ID:
Your support onion(TOR) url:
[+] Preconfig done:
    Work type -
[+] Network communication started - 1.
[+] Network communication started - 2.
[+] Main encryption started.
```

Ransom Note Comparison

The ransomware note has some striking similarities to Revil[1] but

also some differences and misspellings: ---=== Welcome. Again. ===---

```
[-] Whats HapPen? [-]
```

Your files are encrypted, and currently unavailable. You can check it: all files on your system has extension csruj. By the way, everything is possible to recover (restore), but you need to follow our instructions. Otherwise, you cant return your data (NEVER).

[+] What guarantees? [+]

Its just a business. We absolutely do not care about you and your deals, except getting benefits. If we do not do our work and liabilities – nobody will not cooperate with us. Its not in our interests.

To check the ability of returning files, You should go to our website. There you can decrypt one file for free. That is our guarantee.

If you will not cooperate with our service – for us, its does not matter. But you will lose your time and data, cause just we have the private key. In practice – time is much more valuable than money.

[+] How to get access on website? [+]

You have two ways:

- 1) [Recommended] Using a TOR browser!
 - a) Download and install TOR browser from this site:
 - b) Open our website:

2) If TOR blocked in your country, try to use VPN! But you can use our secondary website. For this:

a) Open your any browser (Chrome, Firefox, Opera, IE, Edge)

b) Open our secondary website:

Warning: secondary website can be blocked, thats why first variant much better and more available.

When you open our website, put the following data in the input form: Key: _____

!!! DANGER !!! DON'T try to change files by yourself, DON'T use any third party software for restoring your data or antivirus solutions - its may entail damage of the private key and, as result, The Loss all data. !!! !!! !!! ONE MORE TIME: Its in your interests to get your files back. From our side, we (the best specialists) make everything for restoring, but please should not interfere. !!! !!! !!!

This new RaaS ransom note from

sample(4a97bc8111631795cb730dfe7836d0afac3131ed8a91db81dd

e5062bb8021058):

[+] Whats Happen? [+]

Your files are encrypted, and currently unavailable. You can check it: all files on your system has extension .encoded01. By the way, everything is possible to recover (restore), but you need to follow our instructions. Otherwise, you cant return your data (NEVER). [+] What guarantees? [+] Its just a business. We absolutely do not care about you and your deals, except getting benefits. If we do not do our work and liabilities - nobody will not cooperate with us. Its not in our interests. To check the ability of returning files, You should go to our website. There you can decrypt 1-5 files for free. That our guarantee. If you will not cooperate with our service – for us, its does not matter. But you will lose your time and data, cause just we have the private key. In practise - time is much more valuable than money. [+] How to get access on website? [+] You can open our site by the shortcut "SUPPORT (TOR_BROWSER)" created on the desktop. Also as the second option you can install the tor browser: a) Download and install TOR browser from this site: https://torproject.org/ b) Open our website. Full link will be provided below.



Another similarity we can find but to a different ransomware family is to ClOp, below is the ClOp decryptor page[2].

Your netv	vork has beer	n hacked!
Your documents, emails, databases and other important files encrypted	To decrypt your files you need to buy our special software - CI0p-Decryptor	You can do it right now. Follow the instructions below. But remember that you do not have rough time.
the	Cl0p-Decryptor price price is for all PCs of your infected netw	ork
minutes	Clock on the field to copy the bt:	Current price: BTC Current price: USD

Comparing it to this new RaaS shows a striking similarity:

Your network has been infected!					
•••					
Your documents, photos, databases and other important files encrypted	To decrypt your files you need to buy our special software - General-Decryptor	You can do it right now. Follow the Instructions below. But remember that you do not have much time			
	How to recover my files?)			
We guarantee that you can recover al it. But if you want to decrypt a	l your files safely and easily. You can decry Il your files, you need to pay. Write to supp	rpt a single file for warranty - we can do ort if you want to buy decryptor.			
	You can decrypt 5 files				
	Choose file	Browse			
	Upload				

The file encryption piece for samples we analyzed appear to be using SCOP encryption algorithm.

From the ransomware sample:

🔲 🏑 🖂					
loc 41C8D6:					
xor	ebx, ebx				
mov	bl, al				
add	ebx, 3				
mov	esi, [ebp+var_14]				
mov	ebx, [esi+ebx*4+200h]				
mov	[ebp+var_10], ebx				
add	al, cl				
xor	ecx, ecx				
MOV	cl, al				
add	ecx, 3				
mov	ebx, [ebp+var_14]				
mov	esi, [ebx+ecx*4+200h]				
mov	ecx, [ebp+var_4]				
mov	ecx, [ecx+edx*4]				
add	ecx, [ebp+var_10]				
add	ecx, esi				
MOV	ebx, [ebp+var_8]				
MOV	[ebx+edx*4], ecx				
xor	ecx, ecx				
MOV	cl, [ebp+var_9]				
MOV	ebx, [ebp+var_14]				
MOV	ecx, [ebx+ecx*4+0Ch]				
add	ecx, esi				
inc	[ebp+var_9]				
xor	ebx, ebx				
mov	DI, al				
add	ebx, 3				
mov	edi, [ebp+var_14]				
mov	[ed1+ebx*4+200h], ecx				
MOV	eox, esi				
add	al, DI				
INC	eax				
dec	[eop+var_18]				
Juz	SHOPT 10C_410806				

SCOP from GPLib[4]:

📕 🟹 🔛 loc 41A5AA: ebx, ebx xor b1, c1 MOV ebx, 3 add ebx, [eax+ebx*4+200h] mov. [ebp+var 10], ebx mov add cl, dl edx, edx xor dl, cl mov edx, 3 add esi, [eax+edx*4+200h] MOV edx, [ebp+var 4] MOV MOV ebx, [ebp+var 14] edx, [edx+ebx*4] MOV add edx, [ebp+var 10] add edx, esi ebx, [ebp+var_8] MOV MOV edi, [ebp+var 14] [ebx+edi*4], edx MOV edx, edx xor dl, [ebp+var_9] MOV edx, [eax+edx*4+0Ch] mov. edx, esi add inc [ebp+var_9] ebx, ebx xor bl, cl mov. ebx, 3 add [eax+ebx*4+200h], edx MOV ebx, esi MOV cl, bl add inc [ebp+var_14] [ebp+var_18] dec short loc 41A5AA jnz

IOCs

bottomcdnfiles.com cdnmegafiles.com 179.43.160.195 chat5sqrnzqewampznybomgn4hf2m53tybkarxk4sfaktwt7oqpkcvyd.onion 82.146.53.237 sugarpanel.space15a7fb45f703d5315320eef132f3151873055161 5816a77bf4f8485bfdab1803d948885f76e0c926fed9da5ac02d94e62af8b145 320eefd378256d6e495cbd2e59b7f205d5101e7f 18cb9b218bd23e936128a37a90f2661f72c820581e4f4303326705b2103714a9 e835de2930bf2708a3a57a99fe775c48f851fa8f 1318aeaea4f2f4299c21699279ca4ea5c8fa7fc38354dd2b80d539f21836df5a 98137dd04e4f350ee6d2f5da613f365b223a4f49 aa41e33d3f184cedaaaabb5e16c251e90a6c4ff721a599642dc5563a57550822 a4854ce87081095ab1f1b26ff16817e446d786af 4a97bc8111631795cb730dfe7836d0afac3131ed8a91db81dde5062bb8021058 c31a0e58ae70f571bf8140db8a1ab20a7f566ab5 315045e506eb5e9f5fd24e4a55cda48d223ac3450037586ce6dab70afc8ddfc9

References

1:https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cado-

security/DFIR_Resources_REvil_Kaseya/main/Config/Ransomware_

Note.txt

2:<u>https://malwarewarrior.com/how-to-remove-cl0p-ransomware-and-decrypt-cl0p-files/</u>

3:https://twitter.com/avman1995/status/1459915441766211601

4:<u>https://torry.net/pages.php?id=519</u>